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ABSTRACT: 
The Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) has been a monetary union for several 
decades now. According to the hypothesis of endogenous optimal currency areas (OCA), the degree of business 
cycles synchronization across its member states should be significantly higher today than 40 years ago. 
Investigating the empirical validity of this hypothesis is important in the context of the African economic 
integration process. If currency unions are endogenous, then quick monetary integration is a worthwhile option 
that can be used to accelerate economic integration. On the contrary, if currency unions were not endogenous, 
then a speedy monetary unification would not benefit countries collectively and might therefore jeopardize the 
whole regional integration initiative. 
 
This paper assesses the endogeneity of CAEMC as an OCA by examining the cross-country synchronization of 
business cycles along three statistical dimensions: bilateral correlation of cyclical co-movements, similarity of 
cycle statistical properties, and concordance of cyclical phases. Its innovative contribution is threefold. First, it 
provides a direct test of the endogeneity hypothesis on a specific currency union. Most previous studies instead 
rely on panel estimates of global datasets. Second, it expands the existing literature on the monetary geography 
of Africa. Indeed, there are several papers that study whether or not specific African regions are OCA. 
However, these papers generally look at the ex-ante conditions for optimality, leaving the issue of endogeneity 
of OCA criteria unexplored. The paper fills in this gap. Third, the paper presents a business cycle chronology 
for the six CAEMC members, thus opening up new opportunities to understand the cyclical characterization of 
economic systems and policies in the region. 
 
The main result of the analysis is that (i) the degree of synchronization of business cycles across CAEMC 
countries has remained low throughout the period 1960-2007, but (ii) it has somewhat increased over time. This 
increase is however marginal in both economic and statistical terms, thus implying that CAEMC currency union 
is not as endogenous as one would expect from previous empirical results obtained from global datasets. The 
reason why the endogeneity effect is so weak is that its channels of transmission are not work: intra-regional 
trade is very low and macroeconomic policies across union members do not seem to converge. Furthermore, 
increasingly different productive structures also reduced the intensity of synchronization. The policy 
implications of the analysis then concern the design of policy and institutions in the CAEMC and the way 
forward for monetary unification in Africa. 
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The Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) has been a 
monetary union for several decades now. According to the hypothesis of endogenous 
optimal currency areas (OCA), the degree of business cycles synchronization across its 
member states should be significantly higher today than 40 years ago. Investigating the 
empirical validity of this hypothesis is important in the context of the African economic 
integration process. If currency unions are endogenous, then quick monetary integration 
is a worthwhile option that can be used to accelerate economic integration. On the 
contrary, if currency unions were not endogenous, then a speedy monetary unification 
would not benefit countries collectively and might therefore jeopardize the whole 
regional integration initiative. 
 
This paper assesses the endogeneity of CAEMC as an OCA by examining the cross-
country synchronization of business cycles along three statistical dimensions: bilateral 
correlation of cyclical co-movements, similarity of cycle statistical properties, and 
concordance of cyclical phases. Its innovative contribution is threefold. First, it provides 
a direct test of the endogeneity hypothesis on a specific currency union. Most previous 
studies instead rely on panel estimates of global datasets. Second, it expands the existing 
literature on the monetary geography of Africa. Indeed, there are several papers that 
study whether or not specific African regions are OCA. However, these papers generally 
look at the ex-ante conditions for optimality, leaving the issue of endogeneity of OCA 
criteria unexplored. The paper fills in this gap. Third, the paper presents a business cycle 
chronology for the six CAEMC members, thus opening up new opportunities to 
understand the cyclical characterization of economic systems and policies in the region. 
 
The main result of the analysis is that (i) the degree of synchronization of business cycles 
across CAEMC countries has remained low throughout the period 1960-2007, but (ii) it 
has somewhat increased over time. This increase is however marginal in both economic 
and statistical terms, thus implying that CAEMC currency union is not as endogenous as 
one would expect from previous empirical results obtained from global datasets. The 
reason why the endogeneity effect is so weak is that its channels of transmission are not 
work: intra-regional trade is very low and macroeconomic policies across union members 
do not seem to converge. Furthermore, increasingly different productive structures also 
reduced the intensity of synchronization. The policy implications of the analysis then 
concern the design of policy and institutions in the CAEMC and the way forward for 
monetary unification in Africa.  
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Monetary unification is nowadays a key objective of many African regional economic 
communities (REC)
1. As a consequence, a lively debate on whether specific regional 
clusters of African countries configure as optimal currency areas (OCA) is currently 
ongoing (see for instance Agbeyegbe, 2008; Bangake, 2008; Carmignani, 2006; Fielding 
et al. 2004; Karras, 2007; Tapsoba, 2009). Most of the existing research however focuses 
on the ex-ante assessment of conditions for an OCA. The issue of the potential 
endogeneity of OCA is instead largely neglected
2. The purpose of this paper is to fill in 
the gap. Its relevance is twofold. From an academic perspective, the existence in Africa 
of currency unions that did not necessarily meet the OCA conditions at the time of their 
formation creates the opportunity for a direct test of the endogeneity hypothesis. From a 
policymaking perspective, the finding that currency unions are endogenous would imply 
that quick monetary integration is a worthwhile option even if shocks are asymmetric 
across countries in the same region (as it is often the case in Africa, see for instance 
Buigut and Valev, 2005; Houssa, 2008; Khamfula and Huizinga, 2004). On the contrary, 
if currency unions were not endogenous, then a speedy monetary unification would not 
                                                 
1 UNECA (2004) provides a comprehensive assessment of regional integration in Africa. Out of 14 RECs, 
9 target a complete monetary and economic unification, albeit the time horizon differs across RECs. The 
creation of a continental monetary and economic union in 2023-2028 is also one of the key objectives of 
the African Union. 
 
2 A notable exception is Fielding and Shields (2005). Differences between their paper and this paper are 
discussed below. Tapsoba (2009) also provides evidence on endogeneity by adding a dummy variable for 
membership in a monetary union to the list of regressors in his analysis of the determinant of the 
synchronization of cycles between pairs of countries.  
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benefit countries collectively and might therefore jeopardize the whole regional 
integration initiative. 
 
The idea that OCA might be endogenous has gained momentum following the seminal 
work of Frankel and Rose (1998). They find that in a panel of OECD economies, the 
intensity of cross-country bilateral trade increases the bilateral correlation of a measure of 
economic activity. This result is combined with evidence provided by Rose (2000) that 
currency unions increase bilateral trade in a standard gravity model framework. Thus, 
OCA would be endogenous in the sense that when a currency union is formed, trade 
integration between its members increases, which in turn makes their business cycles 
more synchronized. In fact, deeper trade integration might not be the only channel 
through which monetary unions self-validate. Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) propose a 
model where pricing strategies in a monetary union induce business cycle 
synchronization even in the absence of an effect on bilateral trade. Easier technological 
spillovers (in the spirit of Coe and Helpmann, 1995) might also contribute to greater 
synchronization in the wake of monetary integration. 
 
Much of the empirical literature on the endogeneity hypothesis follows the track set by 
Frankel and Rose (1998) and Rose (2000) and uses panel regressions and gravity models 
to estimate the effects of monetary unions in global data sets
3. Results are not always 
unanimous. Fidrmuc (2004) extends the basic specification of Frankel and Rose (1998) 
and finds that synchronization increases only to the extent that intra-industry trade grows. 
                                                 




Belke (2007) instead links business cycle synchronization to similarities in sectoral 
structures. Barro and Tenreyro (2007) use a newly developed instrumental variables 
procedure to control for the possible endogeneity of exchange rate arrangements and 
economic variables. They find, in line with Rose (2000), that a common currency 
enhances trade
4. However, they also find that a common currency decreases co-
movements of shocks to real GDP, which is at odds with the endogeneity hypothesis. 
Tapsoba (2009) estimates the determinants of synchronization in a large group of African 
countries. He finds that bilateral trade integration increases synchronization, albeit the 
effect is quantitatively smaller than what usually reported for industrial economies. After 
controlling for bilateral trade, the residual effect of monetary unions on synchronization 
is found to be statistically insignificant.  
 
This paper looks at the issue from a different perspective. Instead of estimating panel 
and/or gravity models on large samples of countries, it tests directly the endogeneity of a 
specific currency union: the Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
(CAEMC, perhaps better known with its French name Communauté Economique et 
Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale). The CAEMC is indeed a very interesting case study. 
The currency union was set-up during the colonial period. After independence, the 
members of the community decided to retain the basic monetary and exchange rate 
arrangements of the colonial times. This cluster of six countries has therefore been a 
currency union for several decades now. A straightforward test of endogeneity can be 
therefore implemented by computing measures of business cycle synchronization across 
                                                 
4 The trade effects of currency unions have been estimated by a large number of studies. Rose (2004) 
surveys this strand of the literature and provides meta-estimates of the elasticity of bilateral trade to 
participation into a currency union. 6 
 
CAEMC countries and then checking whether or not they tend to increase over time. This 
will require the preliminary identification and dating of the business cycles of CAEMC 
countries. The resulting chronology represents an important innovative contribution of 
this paper given that no such a thing is available for CAEMC countries in the literature
5.  
 
Methodologically, the exercise proposed in this paper is similar to the one undertaken by 
Savva et al. (2007) and Darvos and Szapary (2008). They both look at whether 
synchronization between the EMU and the new/perspective EU members is increasing 
over time. Their sample is therefore very different from the one used in this paper. 
Moreover, since new/perspective EU members are not yet EMU members, their analysis 
cannot be really interpreted as a test of the endogeneity of OCA. Fielding and Shields 
(2005), on the contrary, specifically look at whether currency unions in West Africa have 
increased macroeconomic integration in the sub-region. Among the measures of 
macroeconomic integration that they consider there is bilateral trade intensity and 
bilateral shock correlations. In this respect, their work provides evidence on whether or 
not West Africa is an endogenous OCA. There are nevertheless some important 
differences between their paper and this paper. First of all, they do not identify and date 
business cycles to assess synchronization across countries. Their test is based on the 
estimation of panel specifications similar to those of Frenkel and Rose (1998) and Rose 
(2000). Furthermore, they treat the whole of the African Financial Community (CFA) as 
a unique monetary union. In fact, the CFA zone consists of two different unions: the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and CAEMC. In spite of 
                                                 
5 To the best of my knowledge. 
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common origins and many similarities, WAEMU and CAEMC have different policy-
making organs (including different central banks), different trade regimes (there are no 
free trade arrangements between the two unions), and a different pace of integration (as 
documented in UNECA, 2004). In conducting a test of endogeneity it is therefore 
important to separate between the two groups. CAEMC is retained as the object of 
investigation in this paper because it has received less attention than WAEMU in 
previous work.  
 
The main result of this paper can be summarized as follows. The various indicators 
examined suggest that synchronization across CAEMC countries is generally quite low, 
but somewhat increasing over time. Still, this increase is mild in economic and statistical 
terms, in line with the weak progresses on regional trade integration and macroeconomic 
policy harmonization/convergence. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the chronology of 
recessions and expansions in CAEMC countries. Section 3 looks at the evolution of 
business cycles synchronization in the region. Section 4 provides a discussion of the key 
results in light of the endogenous OCA hypothesis. Section 5 draws some policy 
conclusions and sets the lines for future research. Appendix A1 contains a technical 
discussion of filtering procedures and algorithms for dating the business cycle. Appendix 
A2 reports the business cycle chronology country by country and some additional results 
that were not presented in the text for the sake of brevity. Appendix A3 presents results 
from an alternative approach to the analysis of synchronization in the CAEMC region. 8 
 
 
2. Detecting and dating business cycle. 
 
2.1. Methodology for the identification and dating of business cycles 
 
The assessment of synchronization requires the preliminary identification and dating of 
business cycles. In a nutshell, this amounts to determining the turning points in the series 
of a variable that can be regarded as a reliable broad-based measure of economic activity 
(i.e GDP or industrial production). Starting with the seminal work of Burns and Mitchell 
(1946), various algorithms for the determination of turning points have been proposed in 
the literature (see, for instance, the recent contributions of Artis et al. 2004; Proietti, 
2005; Harding and Pagan, 2006). Two main approaches can be identified. One goes 
under the name of classical cycle and dates back to the work of Bry and Boschan (1971). 
The classical cycle selects its turning points on the basis of an absolute decline (or rise) of 
the reference series. The other approach is called deviation (or growth) cycle. In this case, 
the original reference series is first decomposed into a trend and a cyclical component by 
means of a filtering procedure. Then turning points are identified on the basis of the 
sequential oscillations of the cyclical component.  
 
When the reference series is relatively persistent and rarely declining in absolute values 
(as it was for instance the case of GDP series in Europe in the early post-war decades), 
then the deviation cycle appears to be analytically more valuable. However, in the 
deviation cycle, the selection of turning points might be sensitive to the choice of the 9 
 
filtering procedure, so that different procedures generate different chronologies. The 
pragmatic methodological choice made in this paper is to present results based on both 
approaches. For the deviation cycle, the filter used to de-trend the original reference 
series is the one proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997), HP from now on. A short 
technical discussion of filtering procedures can be found in the Appendix A1
6. 
 
The reference series used for identification and dating is log real GDP (y). A crucial 
difference between dating the business cycle of African countries and dating the business 
cycle of industrial countries is that for African countries GDP series are normally 
available only on an annual basis. For industrial countries, instead, quarterly if not 
monthly series are available. Given that most of the existing literature focuses on 
industrial economies, the algorithms are generally designed to fit quarterly or monthly 
data. Some modifications are therefore necessary to apply them to annual data.  
 
This paper makes use of a simplified version of the algorithm presented by Artis et al. 
(2004, 2005). In short, the algorithm is based on the following representation. At any 
point in time t the economy is either in recession (Rt) or in expansion (Et). The state 
(recession or expansion) observed at time t continues at time t+1 unless at time t+1 a 
termination sequence occurs. If a termination sequence occurs, then t is a turning point 
(peak of an expansion or through of a recession) and t+1 is the first period of a new 
cyclical phase.  
 
                                                 
6 Results obtained from the application of another very popular filter, the one proposed by Baxter and King 
(1999), are substantially the same as those obtained from the HP filter.  10 
 
In the classical cycle, the expansion termination sequence (ETS) and the recession 
termination sequence (RTS) are defined as: 
 
(1)    {} c y ETS t t − < Δ = +1   
(2)    {} c y RTS t t > Δ = +1  
 
where Δ is the first-difference operator (so that Δy is the growth rate of real GDP) and  c 
is a positive constant. The purpose of introducing c is to make sure that the algorithm 
isolates only major fluctuations, thus making the dating process more robust. In the 
application below, we follow Artis et al. (2004 and 2005) and set c = 0.005 (=0.5%). In 
words, equations (1) and (2) imply that time t is the peak of an expansion (the through of 
a recession) if at time t+1 y decreases (grows) by more than 0.5% relative to year t. 
Otherwise, the expansion (recession) continues in t+1.
7 
 
In the deviation cycle, ETS and RTS are slightly modified to assure that the peak of an 
expansion (the trough of a recession) does not correspond to a negative (positive) value 
of the cyclical component of y. So, let the cyclical component be denoted by y
c, then: 
 
(3)    { } ) ( ) 0 ( 1 c y y ETS t
c
t t − < Δ ∩ > = +  
(4)    { } ) ( ) 0 ( 1 c y y RTS t
c
t t > Δ ∩ < = +  
                                                 
7 The magnitude of fluctuations in CAEMC countries is relatively larger than in European countries. This 
might suggest setting c above the 0.5% threshold value used by Artis et al. (2004 and 2005). As a 
sensitivity check, the values 0.75% and 1% have also been used. Results are not qualitatively different from 
those reported in tables 1 and 4. The additional results obtained from values of c = 0.75% and 1% are 
available from the author upon request.  11 
 
 
Thus, in the deviation cycle, year t is the peak of an expansion (the trough of a recession) 
if the cyclical component of real GDP in year t+1 decreases (grows) by more than 0.5% 
relative to year t and the cyclical component in year t is positive (negative). Otherwise the 
expansion (recession) continues in t+1. 
 
2.2.  A business cycle chronology for CAEMC countries 
 
The algorithm is applied to log real GDP series of the six CAEMC African countries: 
Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial 
Guinea, and Gabon. The sample period is 1960-2007 for all the countries with the 
exception of Equatorial Guinea, for which the starting date is 1985. GDP data are taken 
from the World Bank Development Indicators and the Official Statistics of the Banque 
Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC). 
 
The annual chronology for each country is reproduced in table A2.1 of Appendix A2. 
Table 1 below reports some key summary statistics that help characterizing the cyclical 
fluctuations in the six members of the monetary union. All durations are expressed in 
years. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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A few stylized facts are worth noting. First of all, the classical cycle and the deviation 
cycle generate significantly different chronologies. The proportion of time in expansion is 
considerably longer in the classical cycle. This is to be expected, given that the definition 
of recession in the classical cycle (a decrease in the absolute level of log real GDP) 
corresponds to a rather unlikely event in most countries. Furthermore, turning points are 
more frequent in the deviation cycle. As a consequence, the average duration of a cycle is 
longer in the classical version. This reflects a significantly longer duration of expansions, 
since recessions tend to be longer in the deviation cycle.  
 
Second, the detailed classical cycle chronology reported in the appendix reveals some 
common patterns across countries. All countries, with the only exception of Chad, go 
through at least one period of prolonged expansion, either at the beginning of the sample 
period (CAR, Congo, Gabon) or towards the end (Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea). 
Furthermore, the last years of the sample, characterized by booming oil prices, mark the 
beginning of a phase of expansion for the region as a whole. The pattern is however 
much less clear in the deviation cycle chronology, where episodes of prolonged 
expansion are dispersed over the whole of the sample period and the 2000s are not 
necessarily associated with an expansion at regional level.  
 
Third, a cursory glance at the sequence of turning points and phases suggests that 
business cycles are not very much synchronized. In the classical cycle chronology, the six 
countries happen to be in the same cyclical phase in only 16 out of a total of 48 years. 
This common cyclical phase is always an expansion; that is, countries are never 13 
 
contemporaneously in a recession. Moreover, there are only two years when more than 
two countries turn cyclical phase in the same direction: 1987, when four countries reach a 
trough, and 1988, when three countries reach the peak of an expansion. Cycles look even 
less synchronized in the deviation cycle chronology, where all countries happen to be in 
same cyclical phase only twice (1974 and 1998) in 48 years. However, more frequent 
turning points also imply that countries turn cyclical phase in the same direction more 
often than in the classical cycle chronology.  
 
Finally, it is interesting to look at cyclical dynamics around 1994, the year of the 
devaluation of the franc CFA. The chronologies indicate that prior to the devaluation 
Cameroon went through a phase of prolonged recession. For the other countries, instead, 
the late 80s and early 90s were a period of volatility, with frequent turning points and 
short-lasting cycles. Yet, most of the region was in a recession in 1993 and entered an 
expansion between 1994 and 1995, at least according to the deviation cycle chronology. 
This suggests that the devaluation might have effectively boosted the short term 
macroeconomic dynamics of CAEMC. However, it does not imply that following the 
devaluation cycles across countries have become systematically more synchronized.  
 
3.  Business cycle synchronization in the CAEMC region over time. 
 
3.1. Measuring business cycle synchronization. 
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The degree of synchronization of the business cycles of the CAMEC countries is 
measured along three statistical dimensions. The first one is the intensity of co-
movements across countries: the cross-country contemporaneous bilateral correlations of 
y, y
c, Δy and Δy
c are computed over four overlapping sub-periods (1960-80, 1970-90, 
1980-2000, 1987-2007). An increase in correlation coefficients over time, meaning that 
synchronization is growing, can be taken as evidence in support of the endogeneity 
hypothesis. Following Darvas and Szapary (2008), in addition to the contemporaneous 
correlation, the leads and lags that maximize the bilateral correlations are also calculated. 
From an OCA perspective, zero or small lags/leads are optimal. Therefore, a progressive 
decrease of leads/lags is also to be interpreted as evidence that CAEMC is a self-
validating monetary union. 
 
The second dimension pertains to the statistical properties of business cycles. The first 
order autocorrelation (AC) and the standard deviation (STD) of each of the four series (y, 
y
c, Δy and Δy
c) are computed for each of the six countries over each of the four sub-
periods (1960-80, 1970-90, 1980-2000, 1987-2007). The first order autocorrelation 
measures the persistence of the cycle, while the standard deviation measures its volatility. 
The logic underlying the use of these two measures is that business cycles cannot be 
synchronized if they are very dissimilar in terms of their basic statistical properties. 
Therefore, a progressive reduction in the cross-country dispersion of AC and/or STD will 
be interpreted as an increase in synchronization. 
 15 
 
The third dimension is the correspondence of cyclical phases across countries. If 
countries happen to be in the same phase at the same time, then the delegation of 
monetary policy to a regional central bank does not compromise the stabilization of the 
national cycle. If instead, countries go through different phases at different times, a 
unique regional monetary policy cannot contemporaneously accommodate the 
stabilization needs of all union members. As a consequence, the discordance of cyclical 
phases makes the monetary union sub-optimal. The statistical measure of concordance 
used in this paper follows Harding and Pagan (2001 and 2006). Let Sit be 1 if country i is 
in recession at time t, and zero otherwise. Analogously, Sjt is equal to 1 if country j is in 
recession at time t. Then, the simple matching similarity coefficient (standard 
concordance index) between the two countries is: 
 
(5)    () () [] ∑
=
− − + =
T
t






       where t = 1, ……T 
 
As discussed by Harding and Pagan (2001), the index (5) is upward biased if cycles are 
significantly asymmetric; that is, if countries spend much longer time in one cyclical 
phase than in the other. To avoid this problem, the index has to be mean-corrected. If 
E[Sit] and E[Si=jt] denote the expected values of Sit and Sjt respectively, then the mean 
corrected concordance index is written as: 
 














Both, Iij and I
*
ij are computed for each pair of countries in CAEMC over each of the four 
sub-periods. Again, increasing values of the two indexes over time will be taken as 
evidence in support of the endogeneity hypothesis. 
 
3.2.  Evolution of business cycle synchronization in CAEMC 
 
3.2.1  Evidence from bilateral correlations 
 
Table 2 reports the average contemporaneous correlation coefficient for each country, in 
each sub-period, and for each variable. For the generic country i, this average correlation 
coefficient is simply the average of the bilateral contemporaneous correlations between i 
and all of the other countries in the region
8. The column labeled “Average” reports the 
average of all bilateral correlation coefficients calculated for a specific sub-period. The 
last column of the table reports the average of the lag/lead that maximizes the bilateral 
correlations. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
As expected the bilateral correlations of y are the highest. However, since they tend to be 
influenced by the trend of real GDP, they are also the least informative in terms of 
business cycle synchronization. Therefore, the rest of the discussion focuses on the other 
three variables. 
                                                 
8 The full set of bilateral correlation coefficients and standard deviations for each reference variable, each 




For each of the other three reference series, the bilateral correlations are rather low and 
hardly significant in statistical terms
9. In this sense, there is no evidence of systematic 
cyclical co-movement across countries in the monetary union. However, when comparing 
the first sub-period (1960-80) with the last two sub-periods (1980-2000 and 1987-2007), 
some mild increase in the size of correlation coefficients is observed. In particular, for 
both Δy and Δy
c, the average bilateral correlation is considerably higher in the last sub-
period than in the first sub-period. For the other reference variable, y
c, the highest average 
bilateral correlation is observed in the third sub-period. Moreover, for 10 out 15 country 
pairs, the bilateral correlation coefficient of Δy and y
c is higher in 1987-2007 than in 
1960-1980; for 9 out of 15 the bilateral correlation coefficient of Δy
c is higher in 1987-
2007 than in 1960-1980. One can therefore argue that, while remaining always rather 
low, the degree of co-movement of cyclical fluctuations has to some extent increased 
over time in the CAEMC area
10. 
 
                                                 
9 As a comparison, consider that the average bilateral correlations between EMU members are as follows. 
For the variable Δy: 0.406 in 1960-1980, 0.504 in 1970-1990, 0.496 in 1980-2000, and 0.554 in 1987-2007. 
For the variable y
c: 0.426 in 1960-1980, 0.570 in 1970-1990, 0.622 in 1980-2000, and 0.647 in 1987-2007. 
For the variable Δy
c: 0.357 in 1960-1980, 0.466 in 1970-1990, 0.531 in 1980-2000, and 0.653 in 1987-
2007.   
 
10 As discussed in the Appendix A1, the statistics reported in table 2 for y
c and Δy
c are obtained from a 
Hodrick-Prescott trend-cycle decomposition of y with λ set according to the algorithm of Ravn and Uhlig 
(2002).  The synchronization patterns observed from table 2 hold when a value λ = 100 (as originally 
proposed by Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) is used. As a matter of fact, the cyclical components obtained 
with λ=100 look remarkably similar to those obtained when setting λ according to Ravn and Uhlig’s 
algorithm. Let y
c100 be the cyclical component computed using λ = 100 and yc
RU  the cyclical component 
computed using the Ravhn and Uhlig’s algorithm. The average correlation between y
c100 and yc
RU   is 0.8, 
while the average correlation between Δy
c100 and Δyc
RU  reaches 0.9. Moreover, the series y
c100 and yc
RU  
are in the same cyclical phase on average 87% of the times. The only substantive change when using λ = 
100 is that the peak in the synchronization of y
c series is observed in the second sub-period (1970-1990) 
and not in the third sub-period (1980-2000). Correlations coefficients are also marginally higher when 
using λ = 100, but their trend remains only weakly upward sloping.  18 
 
The evidence from the last column of the table is consistent with the previous 
observations. Bilateral correlations are generally maximized for a non-zero lag, which 
imply a rather low degree of co-movement across countries. However, there is a 
generalized, mild tendency for lag/lead to decrease over time. In particular, the lead/lag 
decreases between the last and the first sub-period for 10 out of 15 country pairs when the 
reference variable is Δy, for 11 out of 15 country pairs when the reference variable is y
c, 
and for 9 out of 15 country pairs when the reference variable is Δy
c. On the other hand, an 
increase in the lag/lead is rare, whatever reference variable is considered.  
 
3.2.2  Evidence from first order autocorrelation and volatility 
 
The extent to which the business cycles of CAEMC countries display similar statistical 
properties is assessed from the data in Table 3. For each sub-period, the table shows the 
dispersion across CAEMC countries of (i) the first order autocorrelation coefficient (AC) 
and (ii) the volatility (STD) of each of the four reference variables. Dispersion is 
measured by the standard deviation of each variable’s distribution across countries. In 
fact, because data for Equatorial Guinea become available only after 1985, the dispersion 
is computed for the group of the five remaining CAEMC countries until 1985 and for the 
full group of six countries afterwards. To make the analysis more robust, the table also 




                                                 
11 The full sets of first order autocorrelation coefficients and standard deviations calculated for each country 
and each reference variable in each sub-period are reported in Tables A2.3 and A2.4 in the Appendix.  19 
 
ISERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Consider AC first. Between the first and last sub-period there is a decrease in dispersion 
for three out of the four reference variables. Focusing on the three variables that are more 
informative for business cycle analysis (Δy,  Δy
c and y
c), the general pattern is 
characterized by an increase in dispersion between the first and the second sub-period, 
followed by a decrease in subsequent sub-periods. However, only for the two detrended 
series, Δy
c and y
c, the observed reduction in the third and fourth sub-period is sufficient to 
bring dispersion below its initial level. The dynamics of dispersion are qualitatively 
similar when Equatorial Guinea is removed from the sample. That is, the increase in 
dispersion between 1960-80 and 1970-90 does not appear to be driven by the inclusion of 
Equatorial Guinea in the CAEMC group. 
 
Turning to STD, its dispersion across countries is generally increasing between the first 
and the last sub-period. With the exception of y, this increase is however not particularly 
strong. Moreover, the pattern is not monotonic and a decrease in dispersion is observed 
between the second and the third sub-period. It is only in the course of the last sub-period 
that countries become significantly more different in terms of the volatility of their 
national cycles. Two complementary factors could account for these growing differences. 
One is the increasing volatility of international primary commodity prices. Given the high 
dependence of CAEMC economies on primary commodity exports, more volatile 
international prices imply more volatile external shocks. The other factor is the 
transformation of Equatorial Guinea into a very fast growing oil economy at the end of 20 
 
the ‘90s. As a matter of fact, if Equatorial Guinea is excluded from the sample, the 
dispersion of STD turns to be lower in the last sub-period than in the first sub-period, 
even though still increasing between 1980-2000 and 1987-2007.  
 
Overall, the analysis of the statistical properties of business cycles provides rather 
ambiguous evidence. In terms of their persistence (as measured by AC), the cycles of 
CAEMC countries might have become marginally more similar over time. In terms of 
their volatility, stronger similarities started to emerge in the course of the ‘80s and the 
early ‘90s, but the tendency reversed in the late 90s, following internal (oil-boom in 
Equatorial Guinea) and external (volatility of international prices) shocks. 
 
3.2.3  Evidence from concordance indexes 
 
For each country i, table 4 shows the sub-period average of bilateral concordance indexes 
(see equations (5) and (6)) between country i and all of the other CAEMC members. The 
last row reports the average of all the 15 bilateral concordance indexes calculated in each 
sub-period (in fact, due to missing data for Equatorial Guinea, the total number of 
bilateral concordance indexes calculated in sub-period 1960-80 is 10). Given that there 
are two possible chronologies, there is a total of four set of indexes: standard index and 
mean-corrected index based on the classical chronology and standard index and mean-
corrected index based on the deviation chronology. 
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The first striking aspect emerging from the data in the table is a substantial lack of 
concordance of cyclical phases across CAMEC countries. The standard index ranges 
between 0.5 and 0.75. However, the mean-corrected index, on average barely above 0, 
indicates that cycles are largely independent and that the standard index is indeed inflated 
by the asymmetric duration of expansions and recessions, especially in the classical 
chronology. As a point of comparison, consider that for European countries, Harding and 
Pagan (2001) report standard concordance indexes around 0.9 and mean-corrected 
concordance indexes around 0.8 (somewhat lower values are reported for the only non-
EMU member in the sample, the UK).  
 
A second aspect that also appears from the table is that in general, after a decrease 
between the first and the second sub-periods, concordance indexes tend to increase in the 
third and the fourth sub-periods. Taking the CAEMC average as a reference, it can be 
seen that the two mean-corrected indexes as well as the standard index based on the 
deviation cycle chronology are higher in 1987-2007 than in 1960-80. The standard index 
based on the classical cycle chronology instead significantly drops in the second and third 
sub-period, but it is on the rise in the fourth sub-period.  
 
Regional averages however hide different patterns at national level. While Gabon, Congo 
and Cameroon quite closely replicate the regional dynamics, Chad, CAR and Equatorial 
Guinea display a more ambiguous evolution. In particular, in CAR none of the indexes is 
significantly higher in 1987-2007 than in 1960-1980, even though Iij
* based on the 22 
 
classical chronology increases remarkably during the two intermediate sub-periods. In 
Equatorial Guinea, standard indexes on average increase, but mean-corrected indexes on 
average decrease. Finally, in Chad, there appears to be on average an increase in the 
concordance with the rest of the union in terms of classical cycle, but in terms of 
deviation cycle concordance seems to be diminishing.  
 
To sum up the evidence, the bilateral concordance of cyclical phases remains relatively 
low throughout the observation period. However, similarly to what observed for other 
indicators of synchronization, concordance marginally increases over time.  
 
3.3.  Sensitivity and robustness 
 
The conclusion drawn from the analysis of the previous subsections is that the 
synchronization of cycles across CAEMC countries is generally low and only weakly 
increasing over time. As further discussed in Section 4, this means that the currency 
union is not as endogenously optimal as one would expect from previous empirical 
results. This subsection considers alternative partitions of the sample period 1960-2007 to 
test the robustness of the above general conclusion and to see whether any structural 
changes have taken place in the region that might have offset the endogeneity effect. 
 
An increase in the synchronization of cycles between two countries can occur through 
any of the following channels (see, for instance Tapsoba, 2009): (i) deeper bilateral (or 
intra-regional) trade integration, (ii) increased similarity of macroeconomic policies, (iii) 23 
 
increased similarity of productive structures, and (iv) increased trade intensity with the 
rest of the world. The endogeneity effect should operate through the first two channels, in 
the sense that the formation of a currency union is expected to increase bilateral trade and 
strengthen policy harmonization between the participating countries. However, if at the 
same time the countries in the currency ions face an increase in the degree of diversity of 
their productive structures and/or a decrease in their volume of trade with the rest of the 
world, then the endogeneity effect will be (to some extent) neutralized. These 
considerations suggest splitting the sample period in sub-periods such that within each 
sub-period the degree of similarity of productive structures across countries and/or the 
intensity of trade with the rest of the world are relatively constant. In this way, the 
evolution of synchronization within each sub-sample is only driven by changes in 
bilateral trade intensity and policy harmonization. In other words, within each sub-period, 
the only channels at work are those through which the endogeneity effect is expected to 
be transmitted. One can the assess separately the strength of the endogeneity effect and 




Empirically, the diversity of production structures between any two CAEMC members i 
and j at time t is defined as: 
 
(7)         
 
 ∑    ,       ,     
         
                                                 
12 If the sample period were split in subsamples such that within each subsample bilateral trade intensity 
and policy harmonization are constant, then the endogeneity effect of the currency union would be voided 
by construction. Appendix A3 presents an alternative approach to the problem of controlling for structural 




where m is a generic production sector (agriculture, industry or services) and vm denotes 
its GDP share. The index (7) is computed for each possible pair of CAEMC countries 
using data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. The average of 
(7) taken over all possible pairs of countries then measures the degree of diversity of 
productive structures in the CAEMC region and it is denoted as PDt. This index increases 
over time, ranging from 0.465 over the decade 1965-75 to 0.694 over the decade 1995-
05. The increase however does not occur uniformly over time: throughout the ‘70s and 
the ‘80s the index remains well below 0.55 and it significantly grows only towards the 
end of the sample period.  
 
To see to what extent the observed increase in the diversity of productive structures might 
have defused the endogeneity effect, the 1960-2007 is split in sub-periods according to 
values of PDt. The problem is to identify the date (or dates) at which the system moves 
from a low-PD regime to a high-PD regime (or vice-versa). Once identified, these dates 
can then be used to define sub-periods characterized by a relatively stable degree of 
diversity of productive structures. To be able to analyze the evolution of synchronization 
within sub-periods, each sub-period will have to be further partitioned into partially 
overlapping “blocks” of 10 year each. This in turn implies that each sub-period should be 
of at least 15 years, so to allow at least two blocks that overlap for five years. 
 
Hamilton (1989) proposes a dating procedure that makes use of a two-state Markov-
switching regime representation of PDt. The application of this procedure yields a 25 
 
regime-switching date at 1992.
13 Between 1960 and 1992 (low-PD regime) PD averages 
at 0.486 while between 1992 and 2007 (high-PD regime) the average is 0.67. The ten 
year blocks are then 1962-72, 1967-77, 1972-82, 1977-87, 1982-92, 1987-97, 1992-02, 
and 1997-07. The first five of these blocks fall within the low-PD regime, the last two 
blocks fall within the high-PD regime while the block 1987-97 overlaps both regimes and 
is therefore regarded as transitory. The measures of synchronization described in 
subsection 3.1 are recomputed for each block and averages across blocks within each of 
the two sub-periods. Table 5 reports, for each of the three reference variables Δy, y
c, and 
Δy
c, the average of bilateral correlations taken over all pairs of countries. Averages of the 
other measures of synchronization tell a very similar and are available upon request. 
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To start with, consider the top part of the table, where the average bilateral correlation is 
shown for each variable and each block. If the increase in the diversity of productive 
structures across countries is the reason why monetary unification has not resulted into a 
sharp increase in synchronization, then one should observe fast growing correlations 
during the low-PD regime and weakly growing (or even decreasing) correlations during 
the high-PD regime. In fact, the data in the table suggest that during the high-PD regime 
correlations have on average marginally decreased, even though the extent of this 
decrease varies considerably depending on the reference variable considered. This is 
consistent with the idea that when productive structures have become very different 
across countries, business cycles have become less synchronized. However, the average 
                                                 
13 The switching date does not change if Equatorial Guinea is excluded from the sample. 26 
 
correlation in the high-PD regime is generally higher than the average correlation in the 
low-PD regime (as the data in the bottom part of the table make clear). More importantly, 
during the low-PD regime, correlations do not display any strong tendency to increase. 
On the contrary, they remain generally low and below 0.1. In this sense, the increase in 
productive structure diversity across countries did not favor greater synchronization. But 
even during a time when productive structures were not so different, synchronization 
remained low and hardly growing over time. 
 
The other variable that might have countervailed the effect of monetary unification on 
synchronization is total trade integration (TT) with the rest of the world. As discussed in 
previous work (see for instance Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005 and Tapsoba, 2009), larger 
trade flows with the rest of the world can increase the bilateral synchronization of cycles 
between countries i and j over and above any effect due to bilateral trade. Possible 
transmission channels of this effect include greater opportunities for technological 
spillovers and/or a higher likelihood of experiencing similar global shocks. In this sense, 
total trade integration might have been an obstacle to greater synchronization in the 
region only to the extent that it has decreased over time, reflecting a progressive isolation 
of CAEMC countries from global trade links. However, this does not seem to be the case. 
For each pair of countries i and j, TT can be simply measured as the sum of exports and 
imports of i plus the sum of exports and imports of j divided by the sum of GDP of i and 
j. Taking averages over all pairs of CAEMC countries, an average of trade intensity of 
the CAEMC region is the obtained. This average increases from 1.403 in 1965-75 to 
1.853 in 1995-05. With the exception of a few years before the 1994 devaluation, TT 27 
 
increases steadily throughout the sample period. Because trade intensity is not decreasing 
over time, one can reject the idea that synchronization was kept low by negative trade 
shocks. Even so, it is interesting to analyze possible regime switches in the TT series. The 
only significant change in regime occurs in 1994, most likely in association with the 
devaluation of the CFA. Following that devaluation, CAEMC also started a series of 
reforms to promote intra-regional trade and foster regional economic integration. One 
therefore wonders to what extent the switch from low-TT to high-TT regime and the 
reforms introduced after the devaluation affected synchronization. The rest of the 
subsection is devoted to answering thing question. 
 
To some extent, the data reported for the period 1987-2007 should already capture any 
possible effect from devaluation and reforms. Moreover, the partition used in Table 5 
(with a switch date at 1992) is very similar to the one that would be obtained by imposing 
a switch date at 1992. The evidence presented in that table is therefore most likely to be 
provide a good representation of possible changes in patterns of synchronization caused 
by the re-alignment of the exchange rate and the reforms. Nevertheless, as a further 
sensitivity check, correlations and concordance indexes have been recomputed for the 
sub-period 1994-2007 (and are available upon request). It turns out that they are quite 
similar to those reported for the sub-period 1987-2007. The only significant change is 
indeed observed with respect to the average correlation of y
c. Its average between 1994 
and 2007 is 0.1, thus higher than the average computed for 1987-2007 (0.047, see table 
2). However, it must be noted that this average of 0.1 is still lower than the average of the 
sub-period 1980-1993 (0.138) and it is only marginally higher than the average of the 28 
 
first sub-period 1960-1980. This confirms that the devaluation and the post-1994 reforms 
did not cause a structural break in the evolution of synchronization.
14  
 
4.  Discussion 
 
A common pattern seems to emerge from the statistical dimensions investigated in 
Section 3: synchronization is low, but somewhat increasing over time. What do then 
these results imply for the endogenous OCA hypothesis? 
 
To answer this question, the results of section 3 must be compared to some benchmark. 
To this purpose, consider the meta-estimates provided by Rose (2004 and 2008): (i) the 
formation of a currency union should increase intra-union trade by between 30% and 
90%, even though for the EMU the trade effect ranges between 8% and 23%; (ii) each 
1% increase in trade between two countries increases the bilateral correlation coefficient 
of detrended outputs by 0.02. There are of course three main caveats in deriving 
benchmarks for the CAEMC from these two sets of meta-estimates. One is that most of 
the papers surveyed in the meta-analysis focus on the EMU, which is structurally a very 
different monetary union from the CAEMC. The second caveat is that the time-frame of 
the meta-estimated effects is not explicit. The final caveat is stated explicitly by Rose 
(2004) in the following terms: “[Thus] it would be unreasonable for anyone to have too 
much confidence in the meta-analytic estimate of the effect of currency union on trade”. 
                                                 
14 A further confirmation of this conclusion comes from the fact that there is no structural break in the time 
series of the standard deviation of y
c, Δy
c and Δy across countries. If the post-1994 reforms had effectively 
increased synchronization to a significant extent, then annual series of the standard deviation should exhibit 
a break around 1994. Various versions of Chow’s test reject this hypothesis.  29 
 
 
However, taking all caveats in mind, an increase in the bilateral correlation coefficient of 
de-trended series between 0.2 and 0.5 can be set a reasonable conservative benchmark. 
The estimates provided in section 3 seem to put CAEMC below this benchmark, thus 
confirming that the observed increase in synchronization in the region is marginal. In this 
respect, it can be argued that the endogenous OCA hypothesis does not fully fit the 
CAEMC data. That is, as an OCA, CAEMC does not seem to be as endogenous as it 
would be expected from the result of previous panel and cross-country estimates. Yet, 
some degree of endogeneity is there, as the growing correlations of output fluctuations, 
the increasing similarities of cycles’ statistical properties and a stronger concordance of 
cyclical phases over time indicate.  
 
The question that remains to be discussed is then what prevents CAEMC from being a 
fully endogenous OCA. As noted in Section 3.3, the increase in diversity of productive 
structures has somewhat reduced synchronization, but it cannot take all the blame for the 
weakness of the endogeneity effect. The same is true for structural chances in total trade 
intensity with the rest of the world. What really explains the lack of endogeneity is 
probably the fact that the two main channels through which a monetary union becomes 
optimally endogenous, namely the intensification of intra-regional trade and the 
harmonization of policies across countries, are not fully at work in CAEMC. Intra-
regional trade in current US$ was 149.26 millions in 1980. By 2007 it reached US$ 
608.62 millions, with an average annual growth of around 11%. However, total 
international trade of CAEMC countries went up from US$ 7444.13 millions to US$ 30 
 
42808.3 millions over the same period of time. This is equal to an average annual 
increase of around 17%. The proportion of regional trade in total international trade has 
therefore decreased, from a mere 2% to an even smaller 1.4%
15. This in turn reflects the 
persistence of high non tariff barriers, most notably the lack of physical connectivity 
across countries and to the poor state of transport infrastructures. In a similar vein, 
CAEMC did not introduce a rigorous framework for policy harmonization in the region 
until 1997. This certainly goes some length in explaining the lack of convergence of 
macroeconomic policies across union members. Between 1970 and 2006, the cross-
country standard deviation of the budget balance has gone up from 3.65 to 12.33, mostly 
as a result of increased dispersion in revenues (while dispersion in expenditures is 
decreasing since 1998). Interestingly, monetary variables also display growing dispersion 
across countries: from 3.54 to 14.37 for the money growth rate and from 0.86 to 2.47 for 
the inflation rate. The fact that monetary variables do not converge in spite of a 




5. Conclusions and directions of future research. 
 
From a policy perspective, this paper bears implications for both the design of CAEMC 
policy and institutions and the process of monetary unification in Africa. With respect to 
the former, CAEMC countries must strengthen policy harmonization and physical 
                                                 
15 Trade data are taken from IMF (2008). 
 
16 For a systematic analysis of macroeconomic policy convergence in the region see UNECA (2007). 
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connectivity, so to activate the channels through which business cycles can become more 
synchronized and hence maximize the potential benefits from monetary integration. A 
revision of the existent set of convergence criteria might therefore be necessary. 
Furthermore, countries should take advantage of buoyant oil (and other natural resources) 
revenues to strengthen the public investment in infrastructures, particularly in relation to 
regional projects of transport development.  
 
With respect to monetary unification in Africa, the CAEMC experience shows that 
currency areas are not necessarily optimally endogenous even after a long period of time. 
Nevertheless, they can be sustained in spite of this lack of optimality and they do tend to 
generate somewhat more synchronized cycles over time. Therefore, it is probably not 
necessary that countries fully meet the optimality criteria before new unions are formed, 
or even before a continental union is envisaged. However, the unification process ought 
to be gradual and attention must be devoted to the design of institutional arrangements for 
monetary and exchange rate policy, to the consolidation of political will, and to the 
preparation of a credible framework to encourage de facto convergence of 
macroeconomic policy instruments. 
 
From a research perspective, four issues to be explored in future work are worth a 
mention. First, the statistical analysis of this paper should be extended to the other 
regional groupings in Africa. Indeed, even if they have not yet achieved the stage of 
monetary unions, several African RECs are making considerable progresses in terms of 
trade integration and policy harmonization frameworks. It would be therefore interesting 32 
 
to see whether such progresses are making business cycles more synchronized. Second, 
future research should analyzed whether or not there exist clusters of countries, within or 
across the borders of existing RECs, which already configure as OCA and/or display the 
characteristics of fully endogenous OCAs. If such clusters existed, then one could 
envisage a process whereby monetary unions are first formed in those clusters, and then 
other countries join in after a gradual transition. Third, for the specific case of CAEMC, it 
will be interesting to study the cyclical characterization of macroeconomic policies. This 
investigation can be done on two levels. At national level, the analysis should establish 
whether fiscal and monetary policy indicators are pro-cyclical, a-cyclical or anti-cyclical. 
At regional level, the focus should be on the common monetary policy to understand 
whether it follows the cycle of any CAEMC member in particular. This would facilitate 
the assessment for each country of the costs and benefits associated with the weak 
synchronization of business cycles. In fact, given that the franc CFA is pegged to the 
Euro, one can imagine that the CAEMC countries which benefit the most from the 
centralized monetary policy are those whose business cycle is more synchronized with 
the European business cycle. At least, this would be true to the extent that the European 
Central Banks bases its monetary policy on the European business cycle. Fourth, the 
statistical methodology could be extended to perform a formal test of synchronization in 
CAEMC countries vs. other country groupings (in Africa and/or outside Africa). The test 
would require the creation of country groupings whose members are selected at random 
and/or on the basis of criteria other than participation in the same currency union. A 
measure of synchronization in these groupings should be then computed and a 33 
 
distribution derived. This distribution can then be used for statistical inference on the 





Table 1: Summary statistics of business cycles in CEAMC countries 
 
 Cameroon CAR  Chad  Congo  Eq  Guinea Gabon 
Classical cycle 
Total turning points 
 
8 12  18  12 8 10 
Average duration of a cycle 
 
12 8  5.33 8  7 9.6 
Average duration of a recession 
 
2.75  2.17  1.44  1.5 1 1.8 
% of time in expansion 
 
77.1% 72.9% 72.9% 81.2% 85.7% 81.2% 
Deviation cycle 
Total turning points 
 
17 20 19 16 11 14 
Average duration of a cycle 
 
5.6 4.8 5.1  6  5.1 6.8 
Average duration of a recession 
 
2.7 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.5  3 
% of time in expansion 
 
50 54.1  54.1 68.7 46.2 56.2 
Note: Reference series is log real GDP for each country (annual data). Sample period is 1960-2007 for each country 
with the exception of Equatorial Guinea, for which the starting date is 1985. The dating is based on the algorithm 
described in the text and in Appendix 1.For full chronology, see Appendix 2. 
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Table 2: Average bilateral correlation coefficients and lag/lead 
 





Log-level of GDP (y)   
60_80 0.694 0.741 0.783  n.a  0.786 0.219  0.645  .. 
70_90 0.739 0.708 0.534 0.737 0.762 0.540 0.670  .. 
80_00 0.429 0.672 0.632 0.675 0.709 0.710 0.638  .. 
87_07 0.758 0.863 0.754 0.879 0.777 0.839 0.812  .. 
          
First difference of log-level of GDP (Δy)   
60_80 -0.129 -0.108 0.081  n.a  0.104  0.128  0.015  1.7 
70_90 0.049 0.028 -0.001 0.093 0.057 0.157  0.064  2.1 
80_00 0.175 0.030 0.076 0.027 0.114 0.073 0.083  1.5 
87_07 0.229 0.089 0.114 0.100 0.157 0.128 0.136  1.1 
          
Detrended GDP (y
c)   
60_80 -0.049 -0.026 0.115  n.a  0.130  0.233  0.081  1.8 
70_90  -0.012  -0.119 0.059 0.035 0.127 0.242 0.055  1.9 
80_00 0.176 0.028 0.243 0.065 0.124 0.240 0.146  1.3 
87_07  -0.039 0.062 0.147 0.054 -0.033 0.089 0.047  1.2 
          
First difference of detrended GDP (Δy
c)   
60_80 -0.110 0.004 -0.025  n.a  0.069  0.102  0.008  1.8 
70_90 -0.093 0.008 -0.043 -0.023 0.024 0.172  0.007  1.7 
80_00 0.007 -0.040 0.089 -0.069 0.060 0.079  0.021  1.3 
87_07 0.019 -0.021 0.164 -0.084 0.077 0.104  0.043  1.3 
                         
Note: For each country and each variable, the average bilateral contemporaneous correlation coefficient 
is computed as the average over each sub-period of the bilateral contemporaneous correlation 
coefficients between that country and all of the countries in the group. The column labeled “average” 
shows the average of all bilateral correlation coefficients computed in each sub-period. In the last 
column, the average lead/lag is computed as the average of the lags/leads that maximize the bilateral 
correlation coefficients in each sub-period. 
CMR = Cameroon, CAR = Central African Republic, TCD = Chad, CNG = Congo, GBN = Gabon, 
GNQ = Equatorial Guinea. 
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Table 3: Variation across countries in first order auto-correlation and volatility of cyclical phases 
 
  First order autocorrelation (AC)  Volatility (STD) 
 60_80  70_90  80_00  87_07  60_80  70_90  80_00  87_07 
 
                              Log-level of GDP (y)
All  countries  0.182 0.084 0.108 0.047  0.182 0.143 0.205 0.330
Excluding  GNQ  0.182 0.079 0.109 0.038  0.182 0.143 0.059 0.096
 
                                First difference of log-level of GDP (Δy)
All  countries  0.133 0.412 0.393 0.331  0.036 0.037 0.033 0.040
Excluding  GNQ  0.133 0.311 0.410 0.356  0.036 0.036 0.012 0.022
 
                                 Detrended GDP (y
c)
All  countries  0.253 0.339 0.199 0.111  0.024 0.026 0.018 0.026
Excluding  GNQ  0.253 0.273 0.203 0.090  0.024 0.026 0.012 0.016
 
                               First difference of detrended GDP (Δy
c)
All  countries  0.127 0.308 0.152 0.081  0.026 0.027 0.021 0.030
Excluding  GNQ  0.127 0.229 0.169 0.085  0.026 0.028 0.016 0.022
         
Note: For each reference variable and each sub-period the table reports the variation of AC and STD across the 
CEAMC members. Variation is measured by the standard deviation of AC and STD across countries in each sub-
period. For each reference variable, the first raw (labeled “All countries”) refers to the variation measured across all 
CAEMC members; the second raw (labeled “Excluding GNQ”) refers to the variation measured across CAMEC 
members excluding the Equatorial Guinea. The full set of AC and STD data by country and sub-periods is given in 
Tables A2.3 and A2.4 in the Appendix. 37 
 
Table 4: Concordance index, averages by country 
    Classical cycle  Deviation cycle 











 60-80  0.71429  -0.0068  0.4881  -0.01361 
CMR 70-90  0.60433  0.00359  0.49524  -0.00202 
 80-00  0.59048  0.06259  0.5619  0.07619 
 87-07  0.67619  0.11156  0.5619  0.10159 
            
 60-80  0.77381  0.07483  0.46429  -0.02154 
CAR 70-90  0.60606  0.00532  0.4381  -0.05916 
 80-00  0.55238  0.02449  0.4381  -0.07664 
 87-07  0.6381  0.07347 0.46667 -0.05079 
            
 60-80  0.66667  0.04762  0.60714  0.10601 
Chad 70-90  0.67013  0.0886  0.52381  0.01831 
 80-00  0.64762  0.08889  0.54286  0.02812 
 87-07  0.71429  0.08707  0.57143  0.06757 
            
 60-80  0.77381  0.03288  0.42857  -0.05272 
Congo 70-90  0.69784  0.06411 0.37143 -0.13284 
 80-00  0.60952  0.05079  0.48571  -0.02902 
 87-07  0.69524  0.06803  0.51429  -0.00408 
            
 60-80  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Eq Guinea  70-90  0.58182  -0.05455  0.24762  -0.24675 
 80-00  0.60952  0.01088  0.50476  0.00907 
 87-07  0.6381  -0.02177  0.44762  -0.04807 
            
 60-80  0.7381  0.01701 0.46429 -0.02154 
Gabon 70-90  0.63203  0.05051  0.41905  -0.08646 
 80-00  0.60952  0.0381  0.55238  0.03492 
 87-07  0.73333  0.07347  0.5619  0.04354 
             
 60-80  0.733  0.033  0.490 0.000 
CAEMC 70-90  0.632  0.026  0.415  -0.08 
 80-00  0.603  0.045  0.514 0.007 
 87-07  0.683  0.065  0.520 0.018 
Note: For each country and sample period, the table reports the average of the bilateral concordance 
indexes (see equations (5) and (6)). The CAMEC average is obtained as the average of all the bilateral 
concordance indexes calculated in each sub-period. The full set of bilateral concordance indexes by 
pairs of countries is reported in Tables A2.5, A2.6, A2.7 and A2.8. 38 
 
Table 5 Average of bilateral correlations over 10-year blocks and sub-periods 






  1962-72 1967-77 1972-82  1977-87 1982-92 1987-97 1992-02 1997-07 
Δy  0.142 0.042 0.034  0.071  0.098 0.171 0.048  -0.020 
y
c  0.137 -0.003 0.058 0.065  0.003  0.065  0.144 0.038 
Δy
c  0.108 0.013 0.022  0.002  -0.006 0.072 0.064 0.046 
            
    
  Low-PD period  High-PD period 
 1962-92  1977-92  1992-07 
Δy  0.040 0.012  0.113 
y
c  0.037 0.027  0.117 
Δy
c  -0.007 -0.022  0.037 
 
Note: The top part of the table shows the average of bilateral correlations for each block of ten years. 
The bottom part of the table shows the average of bilateral correlations for the two sub-periods 
corresponding to low-PD regime (1962-92) and high-PD regime (1992-07) and for a spell of 15 years 
(1977-92) prior to regime switch. 39 
 
Appendix A1. Technical discussion: Dating algorithm and filtering procedure 
 
Formulation of dating rules 
 
The core of the dating procedure is the identification of peaks (P) and troughs (T) in a 
reference series that summarizes the level of economic activity. Let this series (most 
often the log real GDP or industrial production) be yt, where t indicates time.  
 
Bry and Boschan (1971) formulate the following rule for the identification of P and T: 
 
(A1.a)   Peak at t   {} K k y y y y k t t k t t .... 1 , , = > > + −   
(A1.b)   Trough at t    {} K k y y y y k t t k t t .... 1 , , = < < + −  
 
where K = 2 for quarterly time series (typically GDP) and K = 5 for monthly time series 
(typically industrial production).   
 
Following Harding and Pagan (2001), the rule can be expressed in a more compact way 
as: 
 
(A2.a)   Peak at t   {} 0 , 0 < Δ > Δ t k t k y y   
(A2.b)   Trough at t    {} 0 , 0 > Δ < Δ t k t k y y  
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where  k t t t k y y y − − = Δ . In words, a recession occurs if the level of economic activity 
declines for k periods and an expansion if it increases for the same interval. 
 
Artis et al. (2004) generalize the rule through a Markov Chain representation whose core 
parameters are (i) the conditional probability of making a transition from expansion to 
peak and (ii) the conditional probability of making a transition from recession to trough. 
These are in turn non-parametrically scored according to the available time series yt. The 
rule for scoring the transition probabilities is based on the definition of expansion 
termination sequence (ETSt) and recession termination sequence (RTSt): 
 
(A4.a)   () ( ) {} 0 0 2 2 1 < Δ ∩ < Δ = + + t t t y y ETS   
(A5.a)    () ( ) {} 0 0 2 2 1 > Δ ∩ > Δ = + + t t t y y RTS  
 
The sequences (A4.a) and (A5.a) define the homolog of the dating rules of Bry and 
Boschan (1971) and Harding and Pagan (2001) for the case of quarterly date with a two 
quarters minimum duration imposed for each phase.  
 
Algorithm used in this paper 
 
The dating rules and algorithm used in this paper are based on a representation drawing 
most of its elements from Artis et al. (2004). The cycle consists of two mutually 
exclusive phases, recession Rt and expansion Et. An expansion always terminates with a 
peak and a recession always terminates with a trough. At any point in time t the economy 41 
 
is therefore in one (and only one) of four possible states: expansion continuation (ECt), 
peak (Pt), recession continuation (RCt), trough (Tt). Clearly, ECt and Pt are the two states 
belonging to the expansion phase Et and RCt and Tt are the two states belonging to the 
recession phase Rt.  
 
Since expansion and recession are mutually exclusive, the probability of transition from 
ECt to RCt+1 and from RCt to ECt+1 is zero. That is, from ECt the economy can transit to 
either ECt+1 or Pt+1. Symmetrically, from RCt, the system can only transit to either RCt+1 
or Tt+1. In the same vein, from Pt the system can only transit towards one of the two states 
of the recession phase (RCt+1 or Tt+1) and from Tt it can only transit to one of the two 
states of the expansion phase (ECt+1 or Pt+1). Artis et al. (2004) work with quarterly data 
and impose a minimum duration of two quarters for each phase. This implies that there is 
no transition from Pt to Tt+1 and from Tt to Pt+1. However, in this paper data have annual 
frequency and the restriction of the minimum duration of each phase is inevitably set to 1 
period (read, 1 year), so that the sequences {Pt, Tt+1} and {Tt, Pt+1} are admissible.  
 
Whether from ECt the economy transits to ECt+1 or to Pt+1 depends on the realization of 
an expansion termination sequence at time t+1. The expansion termination sequence used 
in this paper is a straightforward adaptation of (A4.a) to the case of annual data: 
 
(A5.a)    {} c y ETS t t − < Δ = + + 2 1      
 42 
 
where the constant c = 0.005 replaces 0 so to exclude minor fluctuations from the 
chronology. Based on (A5.a), time t + 1 is a peak if the GDP decreases by c at time t + 2 . 
Otherwise, t + 1 is the continuation of an expansion. Note that, (A5.a) also establishes 
whether the system at Tt transits towards ECt+1 or Pt+1: if in t + 2 GDP decreases by at 
least c, then t + 1 is a peak of the expansion; if instead at t + 2 the GDP increases (or 
decreases by less than c), then t + 1 is the continuation of the expansion. 
 
The dating rule for the recession follows the same logic. Whether from RCt the economy 
transits towards RCt+1 or to Tt+1 depends on the realization at time t + 1 of the recession 
termination sequence: 
 
(A5.b)    {} c y RTS t t > Δ = + + 2 1  
 
In words, from a state of recession continuation in year t, the economy goes to a trough in 
year t + 1 if in period t + 2 the GDP increases by at least c. Otherwise, the system will be 
in recession continuation in year t + 1. Again, the RTS specified in (A5.b) also defines the 
direction of transition of the system from Pt: if  in t + 2 GDP increases by at least c, then 
the system goes from Pt to Tt+1; otherwise the system goes from Pt to ERt+1 
 
In short, the algorithm is programmed as follows: 
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1.  If at time t  the system is in ECt and ETSt+1 is true, then t + 1 is a peak and the 
system transits to Pt+1; if the system is in ECt and ETSt+1 is not true, then t + 1 is 
the continuation of the expansion and the system transits to ECt+1. 
2.  If at time t the system is at Pt and RTSt+1 is true, then t + 1 is the trough of a 
recession and the system transits to Tt+1; if the system is at Pt and RTSt+1 is not 
true, then t + 1 is the continuation of a recession and the system transits to RCt+1 
3.  If at time t the system is in RCt and RTSt+1 is true, then t + 1 is the trough of a 
recession and the system transits from RCt to Tt+1; if instead RTSt+1 is not true, 
then the recession continues and the system transits from RCt to RCt+1. 
4.  If at time t the system is in Tt and ETSt+1 is true, then t + 1 is the peak of an 
expansion and the system transits from Tt to Pt+1; if instead RTSt+1 is not true, 
then the system transits from Tt to ECt+1. 
 
The deviation cycle 
 
The deviation cycle is obtained from the de-trended component of yt. Several de-trending 
methods are available in the literature. This paper uses two different filtering procedures: 
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) and the Baxter and King 
(BK) filter (Baxter and King, 1999).  
 
The original series y is assumed to result from the combination of two processes:  
 




t t y y y + =  44 
 
(A6.b)    ); 0 ( > Δ
s
t y Var     ); 0 ( >
c
t y Var  
(A6.c)    ) 1 ( I y
s
t ≈ ;    ) 0 ( I y
c
t ≈     
 
y
s is the permanent component and it is normally referred to as the trend while y
c is the 




Econometrically, the problem is how to extract y
s from the observed series y. The HP 
filters computes the permanent component of y by minimizing the variance of y around 
y
s, subject to a penalty that constrains the second difference of s. Formally, y
s is the 
solution to the following constrained minimization: 
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(A7.b)   subject to  [] ∑
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t y y y y λ  
 




t y y y − = . For the purpose of 
this paper, the smoothing parameter λ is set according to the algorithm proposed by Ravn 
and Uligh (2002).  
 
To overcome some of the drawbacks of the HP filter, Baxter and King (1999) propose a 
bandpass filter of finite order K which (i) has trend-reducing properties and (ii) yields no 45 
 
phase shifts in the filter output. Operationally, the filter is defined as a finite moving 
average: 
 









t y L a y   
 
where aj are symmetric weights and L denotes the backshift operator ( n t t
n y y L − = ). The 
symmetric weights are determined as the solution to the following minimization problem 
(see Woitek, 1998): 
 





ω ω α ω β d Q
j a
2
) ( ) ( min  
(A8.c)   subject to α(0) = 0 
 
where   ) (ω β  is the “ideal” filter gain with cut-off frequencies ω1 and ω2. Once the trend 
component is determined from (A8.a) and the solution of the minimization problem, the 
cyclical component y




t y y y − = . In computing the filter, the 
range of durations is set from a minimum of two years to a maximum of eight years.  
 
In the specific case of the data-set used for this paper, the two filtering procedures return 
remarkably similar cyclical components. As a consequence, the deviation chronology is 
the same in the two cases. The paper only reports results based on HP filtered series. 
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After de-trending the original series y, the dating algorithm is applied to the cyclical 
series y
c with one key modification. Following Artis et al. (2004), when dealing with 
deviation cycles, it is necessary to prevent that a peak is located when output is below 
trend level. This is so since an expansion must have brought output above trend. 
Similarly, a trough cannot be located when output is above trend leve, since an expansion 
must have brought output below trend. Therefore, the ETS and RTS are redefined as 
follows: 
 
(A9.a)    { } ) ( ) 0 ( 2 1 c y y ETS t
c
t t − < Δ ∩ > = + +      
(A9.b)    { } ) ( ) 0 ( 2 1 c y y RTS t
c
t t > Δ ∩ < = + +      
 
The new sequences (A9.a) and (A9.b) replaces the definitions (A5.a) and (A5.b) when 





Appendix A2. Additional results 
 
Table A2.1. Business cycle chronology: Classical cycle 
 
Year Cameroon CAR  Chad  Congo  Eq 
Guinea 
Gabon 
1960  EC  EC  EC  EC .. EC 
1961  EC P  EC  EC .. EC 
1962 EC  RC  P  P  ..  EC 
1963 EC  T  R  T  ..  EC 
1964  EC  EC  T EC .. EC 
1965  EC  EC  P EC .. EC 
1966  P EC  T EC .. EC 
1967  T EC  EC  EC .. EC 
1968  EC  EC  EC  EC .. EC 
1969  EC  EC  EC  EC .. EC 
1970  EC  EC  P EC .. EC 
1971  EC  EC  T EC .. EC 
1972  EC  EC  P EC .. EC 
1973  EC  EC  T EC .. EC 
1974  EC  EC  EC  EC .. EC 
1975  P EC  EC  EC .. EC 
1976 T  EC  EC  P  ..  P 
1977 EC  EC  EC  T  ..  RC 
1978 EC  P  P  EC  ..  RC 
1979 P  RC  RC  EC  ..  T 
1980  T  RC P  EC EC EC 
1981 EC  T  EC  EC  EC  P 
1982 EC  PC  EC  EC  EC  T 
1983  EC  T EC EC EC EC 
1984 EC  EC  EC  P  EC  P 
1985  EC  EC P RC P RC 
1986 P  P  RC  RC  T  RC 
1987  RC T T  T EC T 
1988 RC  EC  EC  EC  P  EC 
1989  RC  EC P EC T EC 
1990 RC  RC  T  EC  P  EC 
1991 RC  RC  EC  EC  T  P 
1992 RC  RC  P  P  EC  T 
1993 RC  T  T  RC  EC  EC 
1994 T  EC  EC  T  EC  EC 
1995  EC  P EC EC EC EC 
1996 EC  T  EC  P  EC  EC 
1997 EC  EC  EC  T  EC  EC 
1998 EC  EC  P  P  EC  P 
1999  EC  EC  RC T EC T 48 
 
2000  EC EC T  EC EC EC 
2001  EC  P EC EC EC EC 
2002  EC RC  EC EC EC EC 
2003  EC  T EC EC EC EC 
2004  EC EC EC EC EC EC 
2005 EC  EC  EC  EC  P  EC 
2006  EC  EC  EC  EC T EC 
2007 
 
EC EC EC EC EC EC 
Note: EC = expansion continuation, P = peak of an expansion (turning point), RC = recession 
continuation, T = trough of a recession (turning point) 
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Table A2.2. Business cycle chronology: Deviation cycle 
 
Year Cameroon  CAR  Chad  Congo  Eq 
Guinea 
Gabon 
1960  RC  EC EC EC  .. EC 
1961 T  P  EC  EC  ..  P 
1962 EC  RC  P  P  ..  RC 
1963 EC  RC  R  T  ..  RC 
1964 EC  RC  T  EC  ..  T 
1965 EC  RC  P  P  ..  P 
1966 P  TR  RC  RC  ..  RC 
1967 T  PE  RC  T  ..  RC 
1968 EC  T  T  EC  ..  RC 
1969 EC  P  EC  EC  ..  RC 
1970 P  RC  P  EC  ..  RC 
1971 RC  RC  RC  EC  ..  RC 
1972 RC  RC  RC  EC  ..  RC 
1973 T  T  T  EC  ..  T 
1974 EC  P  EC  EC  ..  EC 
1975 P  T  EC  P  ..  EC 
1976 T  EC  EC  RC  ..  P 
1977 EC  EC  EC  T  ..  RC 
1978 P  P  P  EC  ..  T 
1979 RC  RC  RC  EC  ..  EC 
1980 T  RC  T  EC  EC  EC 
1981 P  T  EC  EC  P  EC 
1982  RC  P EC P RC  EC 
1983 T  T  P  RC  RC  EC 
1984 EC  EC  T  RC  T  P 
1985  EC  EC P RC P  RC 
1986 P  P  RC  T  T  RC 
1987 RC  T  T  EC  EC  T 
1988  T  EC EC EC  P EC 
1989 P  P  P  EC  RC  EC 
1990 RC  RC  T  EC  RC  EC 
1991 RC  RC  EC  EC  T  P 
1992  RC T P P P  RC 
1993 RC  EC  T  RC  RC  RC 
1994 T  EC  EC  T  RC  T 
1995 EC  P  EC  EC  T  EC 
1996 EC  T  EC  P  EC  EC 
1997  EC  EC  EC T EC  EC 
1998 P  EC  P  P  EC  P 
1999 RC  EC  RC  T  P  T 
2000  RC  EC RC EC RC  EC 
2001 RC  P  RC  EC  T  P 50 
 
2002 RC  RC  T  P  EC  T 
2003 RC  T  EC  RC  EC  EC 
2004 RC  EC  P  T  P  EC 
2005  T  EC RC EC RC  EC 
2006  EC  EC RC EC RC  EC 
2007 
 
EC  EC RC EC RC  EC 
Note: EC = expansion continuation, P = peak of an expansion (turning point), RC = recession 
continuation, T = trough of a recession (turning point) 51 
 
Appendix A2. 3   First order autocorrelation of references variables 
 
    60-80 70-90 80-00 87-07    60-80 70-90  80-00 87-07 
             
  Log-level of GDP (y)   Detrended GDP (y
c)
CMR  0.837*** 0.899*** 0.674*** 0.874***   -0.129 -0.035  0.285  0.145 
CNG  0.838*** 0.879*** 0.562*** 0.814***   0.519** 0.597*** 0.395*  0.057 
GBN  0.881*** 0.720*** 0.819*** 0.768***   0.398* 0.352*  0.155  0.260 
GNQ ..  0.693***  0.816*** 0.898***   .. -0.352  0.349*  0.337* 
CAR  0.901*** 0.760*** 0.648*** 0.810***   0.125 -0.049 -0.093 0.212 
TCD 0.461**  0.768***  0.806*** 0.820***   0.308 0.252 -0.015 0.063 
              
  First difference of log-level of GDP (Δy)    First difference of detrended GDP (Δy
c) 
CMR 0.023 0.224  0.543*** 0.771***   -0.203 -0.225  -0.392 -0.070 
CNG 0.282  0.569***  0.523**  0.003    0.051 0.148 -0.062  -0.285 
GBN 0.355* 0.302 -0.086  -0.149    0.000 -0.056 -0.200 -0.241 
GNQ ..  -0.557***  0.435**  0.378*    .. -0.723***  -0.334 -0.136 
CAR 0.104  -0.284  -0.241  0.103    -0.233 -0.474** -0.461** -0.170 
TCD 0.198 0.126  -0.283  0.061    -0.031 -0.194 -0.417**  -0.246 
Note: For each country and each sub-period, the table shows the first order autocorrelation coefficient of each of 
the four reference variables. CMR = Cameroon, CNG = Congo, GBN = Gabon, GNQ = Equatorial Guinea, CAR 
= Central African Republic, TCD = Chad. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% 
confidence level.  
  52 
 
Table A2.4. Volatility of business cycles in CAMEC countries 
 60-80  70-90  80-00  87-07    60-80 70-90 80-00 87-07 
            
  Log-level of GDP (y)   Detrended GDP (y
c) 
CMR 0.273 0.402 0.123 0.161    0.039 0.048 0.036 0.021 
CNG 0.314 0.401 0.138 0.151    0.085 0.093 0.046 0.038 
GBN 0.544 0.291 0.156 0.168    .. 0.021  0.073  0.083 
GNQ .. 0.113  0.632  0.961    0.019 0.026 0.029 0.025 
CAR 0.137 0.083 0.077 0.084    0.049 0.061 0.054 0.054 
TCD 0.075  0.159 0.238 0.342   0.058 0.053 0.034 0.016 
              
 
First difference of log-level of GDP 
(Δy)    First difference of detrended GDP 
(Δy
c) 
CMR 0.065 0.072 0.058 0.042    0.058 0.053 0.034 0.016 
CNG 0.053 0.072 0.070 0.033    0.038 0.043 0.040 0.028 
GBN 0.128 0.139 0.064 0.061    0.095 0.105 0.059 0.054 
GNQ .. 0.041  0.139  0.139    .. 0.037  0.085  0.095 
CAR 0.031 0.042 0.048 0.039    0.024 0.038 0.043 0.033 
TCD 0.068  0.091 0.081 0.087   0.056 0.074 0.074 0.073 
                     
Note: For each country and each sub-period, the table shows the standard deviation of the four reference 
variables. CMR = Cameroon, CNG = Congo, GBN = Gabon, GNQ = Equatorial Guinea, CAR = Central 
African Republic, TCD = Chad. 
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Table A2. 5 Standard bilateral concordance index: classical cycle 
      CMR  CAR  Chad  Congo  Eq Guinea  Gabon   
 60-80   0.762 0.619 0.761  ..  0.714   
CMR 70-90    0.714 0.667 0.619 0.545 0.476   
 80-00   0.714 0.619 0.524 0.619 0.476   
 87-07   0.714 0.667 0.667 0.667 0.667   
              
 60-80  0.762    0.762  0.809 .. 0.762   
CAR 70-90  0.714    0.762 0.619 0.364 0.571   
 80-00  0.714    0.619 0.428 0.524 0.476   
 87-07  0.714    0.667 0.571 0.571 0.667   
              
 60-80  0.619  0.762    0.667 .. 0.619   
Chad 70-90  0.667  0.762    0.667 0.636 0.619   
 80-00  0.619  0.619    0.714 0.619 0.667   
 87-07  0.667  0.667    0.809 0.619 0.809   
              
  60-80  0.762 0.809 0.667    .. 0.857   
Congo  70-90  0.619 0.619 0.667    0.727 0.857   
  80-00  0.524 0.428 0.714    0.619 0.762   
  87-07  0.667 0.571 0.809    0.619 0.809   
              
 60-80 .. .. .. ..    ..  
Eq  Guinea  70-90  0.545 0.364 0.636 0.727    0.636  
  80-00  0.619 0.524 0.619 0.619    0.667  
  87-07  0.667 0.571 0.619 0.619    0.714  
              
  60-80  0.714 0.762 0.619 0.857  ..     
Gabon  70-90  0.476 0.571 0.619 0.857 0.636     
  80-00  0.476 0.476 0.667 0.762 0.667     
  87-07  0.667 0.667 0.809 0.809 0.714     
                          
Note: For each pair of countries, the table reports the standard bilateral concordance index Iij (see equation 
(5) in the test for definition). The concordance index in this table is computed on the basis of the classical 
cycle chronology. 54 
 
Table A2.6. Mean-corrected bilateral concordance index: classical cycle. 
 
      CMR  CAR  Chad  Congo  Eq Guinea  Gabon   
 60-80     0.041 0 -0.027 ..  -0.041   
CMR 70-90     0.122 0.095 -0.014  -0.091  -0.095   
 80-00     0.204 0.095  0  0.068  -0.054   
 87-07     0.186 0.104 0.104 0.082  0.082   
                  
 60-80  0.041    0.159 0.059  ..  0.041   
CAR 70-90  0.122    0.190 -0.014  -0.273  0   
 80-00  0.204    0.095 -0.095  -0.027  -0.054   
 87-07  0.186    0.104 0.009  -0.014  0.082   
                  
 60-80  0 0.159    0.032 ..  0   
Chad 70-90  0.095  0.190    0.063 0.030  0.063   
 80-00  0.095  0.095    0.159 0  0.095   
 87-07  0.104  0.104    0.172 -0.068  0.122   
                  
 60-80  -0.027  0.059  0.032    .. 0.068   
Congo 70-90  -0.014  -0.014  0.063    0.030 0.254   
 80-00  0 -0.095  0.159    0 0.190   
 87-07  0.104  0.009  0.172    -0.068 0.122   
                  
 60-80  ..  ..  ..  ..    ..  
Eq Guin  70-90  -0.091  -0.272  0.030  0.030    0.030  
 80-00  0.068  -0.028 0  0    0.014  
 87-07  0.082  -0.014  -0.068  -0.068    -0.041  
                  
 60-80  -0.041  0.041  0  0.068  ..      
Gabon 70-90  -0.095  0  0.063  0.254  0.030      
 80-00  -0.054  -0.054  0.095  0.190  0.014      
 87-07  0.082  0.082  0.122  0.122  -0.041      
                         
Note: For each pair of countries, the table reports the standard bilateral concordance index I
*
ij (see 
equation (6) in the test for definition). The concordance index in this table is computed on the basis of the 
classical cycle chronology. 
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Table A2.7: Standard bilateral concordance index: deviation cycle  
 
      CMR  CAR  Chad  Congo  Eq Guinea  Gabon   
 60-80    0.428 0.667 0.524  ..  0.333   
CMR 70-90    0.714 0.714 0.381 0.238 0.428   
 80-00    0.619 0.619 0.428 0.571 0.571   
 87-07    0.571 0.619 0.524 0.476 0.619   
             
 60-80  0.428    0.762 0.333  ..  0.333   
CAR 70-90 0.714    0.714 0.286 0.190  0.286   
 80-00  0.619    0.524 0.333 0.381  0.333   
 87-07  0.571    0.476 0.476 0.333  0.476   
             
 60-80  0.667  0.762    0.333 .. 0.667   
Chad 70-90 0.714 0.714    0.286 0.286 0.619   
 80-00  0.619  0.524    0.333 0.571 0.667   
 87-07  0.619  0.476    0.476 0.667 0.619   
             
  60-80  0.524 0.333 0.333    .. 0.524   
Congo  70-90  0.381 0.286 0.286    0.333 0.571   
  80-00  0.428 0.333 0.333    0.571 0.762   
  87-07  0.524 0.476 0.476    0.381 0.714   
             
  60-80  .. .. ..      ..  
Eq  Guinea  70-90  0.238 0.190 0.286 0.333    0.190  
  80-00  0.571 0.381 0.571 0.571    0.428  
  87-07  0.476 0.333 0.667 0.381    0.381  
             
  60-80  0.333 0.333 0.667 0.524  ..     
Gabon  70-90  0.428 0.285 0.619 0.571 0.190     
  80-00  0.571 0.333 0.667 0.762 0.428     
  87-07  0.619 0.476 0.619 0.714 0.381     
                         
Note: For each pair of countries, the table reports the standard bilateral concordance index Iij (see equation 




Table A2.8. Mean-corrected bilateral concordance index: deviation cycle. 
 
   CMR  CAR  Chad  Congo  Eq  Guinea  Gabon   
 60-80    -0.054 0.163 -0.014  ..  -0.150   
CMR 70-90    0.213 0.218 -0.109  -0.264 -0.068   
 80-00    0.136 0.136 -0.054 0.068 0.095   
 87-07    0.127 0.127 0.095 -0.032 0.190   
            
 60-80  -0.054    0.267 -0.104  ..  -0.195   
CAR 70-90 0.213    0.218 -0.204  -0.312 -0.211   
 80-00  0.136    -0.004 -0.195 -0.113 -0.206   
 87-07  0.127    -0.032 -0.095 -0.159 -0.095   
            
 60-80  0.163  0.267    -0.179 ..  0.172   
Chad 70-90  0.218  0.218    -0.245 -0.208  0.109   
 80-00  0.136  -0.004    -0.195 0.078  0.127   
 87-07  0.127  -0.032    -0.034 0.168  0.109   
            
  60-80 -0.014 -0.104 -0.179    .. 0.086   
Congo  70-90 -0.109 -0.204 -0.245    -0.147 0.041   
  80-00 -0.054 -0.195 -0.195    0.077 0.222   
 87-07  0.095  -0.095  -0.034    -0.109 0.122   
            
  60-80  .. .. .. ..    ..  
Eq  Guinea  70-90 -0.264 -0.312 -0.208 -0.147    -0.303  
  80-00 0.068 -0.113 0.078  0.077    -0.063  
 87-07  -0.032  -0.159  0.168  -0.109    -0.109  
            
 60-80  -0.150  -0.195  0.172  0.086  ..     
Gabon  70-90  -0.068 -0.211 0.109  0.041 -0.303     
  80-00 0.095 -0.206 0.127  0.222 -0.063     
  87-07 0.190 -0.095 0.109  0.122 -0.109     
                         
Note: For each pair of countries, the table reports the standard bilateral concordance index I
*
ij (see equation 




Appendix A3. Evidence from a regression approach 
 
Regression analysis of the determinants of synchronization is usually performed on large 
sample of countries across different regions (see for instance Tapsoba, 2009). As 
discussed in the introduction, there are good reasons to focus on a single region (CAEMC 
in the case of this paper) and use a different statistical methodology. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to see whether the overall conclusions of the paper hold when standard 
regression models are employed. 
 
Previous research on the endogeneity of OCA (see Frenkel and Rose, 1998 and Corsetti 
and Pesenti, 2002) suggests that the creation of a monetary union between two countries, 
i and j, is expected to strengthen the bilateral correlation of business cycles (σij) through 
two channels: (i) stronger bilateral trade and (ii) greater coordination/harmonization of 
domestic macroeconomic policies. In addition to bilateral trade and policy harmonization, 
there are other two main factors that can affect σij (see the discussion in Tapsoba, 2009): 
(iii) the difference in productive structures across countries and (iv) total trade intensity 
of the two countries.  
 
A simple formal representation of these relationships is as follows: 
 
(A10)               ,      ,      ,       
(A11)                ,       58 
 
(A12)                ,       
 
Where ij denote the pair of two generic countries, t denotes time, ρ is the measure of 
synchronization of their business cycles, TI is the trade intensity between the two 
countries, TT is the total trade of the two countries with the rest of the world, PD is the 
index of diversity of production structures, PS the measure of policy similarities between 
the two countries, MU an indicator that captures common membership in a monetary 
union, Z is a vector of other determinants of trade intensity and W is a vector of other 
determinants of policy similarities (PD is an element of both Z and W and Z and W have 
several other elements in common). The reduced form model is then obtained by 
substituting (A11) and (A12) into (A10): 
 
(A13)                  ,     ,       ,          ,        
 
The most obvious complication in estimating equation (A13) on a sample that only 
includes CAEMC countries is the empirical definition of MU. In the literature that makes 
use of the regression approach, MU is generally defined as a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if i and j are in the same monetary union. Applying this definition to the present 
context would imply that MU is a vector of 1s and hence that it corresponds to the 
intercept of the regression equation. An alternative definition is therefore necessary. In 
principle, one could create a variable that measures the “effective” engagement of a 
country in the monetary union. Of course, to avoid endogeneity problems, this effective 
engagement should not be measured by (a) correlation of cycles with other countries, (b) 59 
 
intensity of bilateral trade, and (c) degree of policy harmonization. In practice, designing 
and measuring such a variable would be quite difficult and it would involve some 
significant degree of subjectivity.  
 
A more practical approach is to think of the monetary union effect in terms of time trend: 
if the currency union is endogenously optimal, then σij should increase over time after 
controlling for other possible determinants of synchronization. MU can therefore be 
coded as a time trend and a positive and statistically significant coefficient on this time 
trend will be taken as evidence that the CAEMC currency union is optimally endogenous. 
The results from regressing σij on a time trend and additional controls are reported in 
Table A3.1 below. 
 
Table A3.1: Regression analysis 
   1    2 3      4 
Constant 0.071  *  0.098 -0.662  -0.169
MU (Time trend)  -0.003  0.003 -0.011  ..
PD  .. -0.146 **  -0.244 ***  -0.274 *** 
TT  .. 0.016 0.071  *  0.055 * 
Distance ..  .. -0.228  ***  -0.223 *** 
Economic size  ..  .. 0.055  ***  0.043 ** 
Common border  ..  .. -0.184  **  -0.185 ** 
Landlocked ..  .. 0.163  0.149
R
2  0.10 0.19 0.46 0.44
Obs 105  105 105  105
                          
Notes, *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively. 
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The sample period for estimation is 196-2007 (the panel is however unbalanced because 
data for Equatorial Guinea are available only since 1987). This period is divided into 
overlapping blocks of 10 years each. Synchronization in each block is measured as the 
average of bilateral correlations of the cyclical components of GDP. Estimation is by 
OLS. The Hausman test of endogeneity reveals that both PD and TT are exogenous to the 
dependent variable. Nevertheless, all of the regressions have been re-run using a 2SLS, 
with PD and TT instrumented by their lagged values, and results did not significantly 
differ from those obtained from OLS estimation.  
 
In column 1, no additional control variable is used. The time trend is largely insignificant, 
denoting that there is no significant increase in synchronization over time. PD and TT are 
measured as the corresponding variables in subsection 3.3. of the paper. Their inclusion 
in column 2 does not change the result on the time effect. At the same time, there is 
evidence that increasing diversity of productive structures reduces synchronization to a 
significant extent. In column 3, the variables in vectors Z and W are added. These include 
standard gravity variables: the product of the log GDP of the two countries to capture 
total economic size, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the two countries share a 
common border, a dummy variable taking value if either of the two countries is 
landlocked, and the log of the distance between the two countries. Other popular gravity 
variables (such as dummies for common language and common colonizer) display too 
little variation in the sample of CAEMC countries. The gravity variables plus PD and TT 
are also taken to be a good representation of the other determinants of policy 61 
 
harmonization.
17 The only counterintuitive result in column 3 is the positive coefficient 
on the landlocked dummy variable. However, for the purpose of estimating the effect of 
the time trend on synchronization, nothing changes between column 3 and columns 1 and 
2. In this respect, the regression analysis confirms the results reported in the rest of the 
paper concerning the weakness of the endogeneity effect in the CAEMC region.  
 
The estimation of a regression model can be helpful in conducting a second type of 
exercise. In fact, the idea that the effect of a monetary union on synchronization can be 
fully accounted for by a time trend might be too restrictive. A more flexible approach is 
to re-estimate the regression model in column (3) without time trend to obtain the fitted 
values        and then compare these fitted values with the observed correlations σij. If the 
all other determinants of synchronization are correctly accounted for, then the difference 
between actual and fitted value represents the effect of the monetary union and therefore 
captures the extent to which CAEMC is an endogenously optimal OCA. The equation 
without time trend is re-estimated in column (4) of table A3.1. Table A3.2 below reports 
the average difference between actual and fitted values for every pair of CAEMC 
countries over the entire sample period and for every ten-year block across all pairs of 
countries.  
 
Two main observations can be drawn from the table. First, the difference between actual 
and fitted values does not significantly increase over time. This again suggests that the 
CAEMC currency union is not strongly endogenously optimal. Second, for a few bilateral 
                                                 
17 Another possible exogenous determinant of policy harmonization is the similarity of exchange rate 
arrangements. However, since all countries in this sample are in a monetary union, this variable is not 
relevant in the present context.  62 
 
pairs, the difference is quite large, meaning that for those pairs the currency union has 
indeed contributed to strengthening the synchronization of cycles. However, when taking 
the average over all pairs, the difference reduces to 0.021. This is equivalent to a mere 
7% of the total standard deviation of the actual values of σij. Again, the conclusion is that 
the currency union has somewhat strengthened bilateral correlations, but this effect is 
quite marginal and – on average - insufficient to result in a significantly upward sloping 
trend of synchronization over time.  
 
 Table A3.2. Difference between actual and fitted correlations of y
c 
Average effect by country pair 
  
Average effect by 
10-year block 
CMR-CNG -0.010 CNG-TCD -0.082 1 0.125 
CMR-GBN -0.244 GBN-GNQ -0.061 2 -0.018 
CMR-GNQ 0.272 GBN-RCA -0.020 3 0.018 
CMR-RCA 0.004  GBN-TCD  0.215 4 0.044 
CMR-TCD -0.056 GNQ-RCA  -0.202 5 -0.037 
CNG-GBN 0.335 GNQ-TCD 0.378 6 0.003 
CNG-GNQ -0.269  RCA-TCD  0.136 7 0.084 
CNG-RCA -0.071  8 -0.028 
                       





Agbeyegbe, T.D. (2008). On the feasibility of a monetary union in the Southern Africa 
Development Community. International Journal of Finance and Economics, 13, 135 - 
204   
  
Artis, M. Marcellino, M. and Proietti, T. (2004). Dating the Euro-Area Business Cycle. 
Oxford Bullettin of Economics and Statistics, 66, 537-565 
 
Artis, M. Marcellino, M. and Proietti, T. (2005). Characterizing Business Cycles for 
Accession Countries. Journal of Business Cycle Measurement and Analysis, 2, 7-41. 
 
Bangake, C. (2008). Exchange Rate Volatility and Optimum Currency Area: Evidence 
from Africa. Economics Bulletin, 6, 1-10.  
 
Barro, R. and Tenreyro, S. (2007). Economic Effects Of Currency Unions. Economic 
Inquiry, 45,1-23. 
 
Baxter, M. and King, R. (1999). Measuring Business Cycles: Approximate Band-Pass 
Filters For Economic Time Series. Review of Economics and Statistics, 81, 575-593. 
 
Baxter, M. and Kouparitsas, M. (2005). Determinants of Business Cycles Co-movement: 
a robust analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 113-157. 64 
 
 
Belke, A. (2007). Endogenous Optimum Currency Areas and the Blend of Sectors - On 
the Determinants of Business Cycle Correlation across European Regions. Journal of 
Economic Integration, 22, 26-49 
 
Bry, G. and Broschan, C. (1971). Cyclical Analysis of Time Series: Selected Procedures 
and Computer Programs. New York, NBER. 
 
Buigut, S.K. and Valev, N.T. (2005). On the Adequacy of Monetary Arrangements in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Economy 28, 349-373. 
 
Burns, A.F. and Mitchell, W.C. (1946). Measuring Business Cycles. New York, NBER. 
 
Carmignani, F. (2006). The Road to Regional Integration in Africa: Macroeconomic 
Convergence and Performance in COMESA. Journal of African Economies, 15, 212-250.  
 
Coe, D.T. and Helpmann E. (1995). International R&D Spillovers. European Economic 
Review, 39, 859-887. 
 
Corsetti, G. and Pesenti, P. (2002). Self-Validating Optimum Currency Areas. NBER 
Working Paper 8783. 
 65 
 
Darvas, Z. and Szapáry, G. (2008). Business Cycle Synchronization in the Enlarged EU. 
Open Economies Review, 19, 1-19. 
 
Fidrmuc, J. (2004). The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria, Intra-
industry Trade, and EMU Enlargement. Contemporary Economic Policy, 22, 1-12. 
 
Fielding, D., Lee, K. and Shields, K. (2004). The Characteristics of Macroeconomic 
Shocks in the CFA Franc Zone. Journal of African Economies, 13, 488-517   
 
Fielding, D. and Shields, K. (2005). The Impact of Monetary Union on Macroeconomic 
Integration: Evidence from West Africa. Economica, 72, 683-704. 
 
Frankel, J. and Rose, A. (1998). The Endogeneity of Optimal Currency Area Criteria. 
Economic Journal, 108, 1009-1025. 
 
Hamilton, J. (1989). A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonstationary Time 
Series and the Business Cycle.  Econometrica, 57, 357-84 
 
Harding, D. and Pagan, A. (2001). Extracting, Using and Analysing Cyclical Information. 
MPRA Paper 15, University Library of Munich, Germany. 
 
Harding, D. and Pagan, A. (2006). Synchronization of cycles. Journal of Econometrics, 
132, 59-79. 66 
 
 
Hodrick, R. and Prescott, E. (1997). Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical 
Investigation. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 29, 1-16. 
 
Houssa, R. (2008). Monetary Union in West Africa and Asymmetric Shocks: a Dynamic 
Structural Factor Model Approach. Journal of Development Economics, 66, 199-224. 
 
IMF – International Monetary Fund (2008). Direction of Trade Statistics. Washington.  
 
Karras, G. (2007). Is Africa an Optimum Currency Area? A Comparison of 
Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits. Journal of African Economies 16, 234-258. 
 
Khamfula, Y. and Huizinga, H. (2004). The Southern African Development Community: 
suitable for a monetary union ? Journal of Development Economics, 73, 699-714. 
 
Proietti, T. (2005). New algorithms for dating the business cycle. Computational 
Statistics and Data Analysis, 49, 477-498.  
 
Ravn M. and Uhlig H. (2002). On Adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott Filter for the 
Frequency of Observations. Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 371-375.  
 
Rose, A. (2000). One Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies 
on Trade. Economic Policy, 30, 9-45. 67 
 
 
Rose, A. (2004). A Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Common Currencies on International 
Trade. NBER Working Paper 10373  
 
Rose, A. (2008). EMU, Trade and Business Cycles Synchronization. Mimeo. Haas 
School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. 
 
Savva, C., Neanidis, K., and Osborn, D. (2007). Business Cycle Synchronization of the 
Euro Area with the New and Negotiating Member Countries. University of Manchester, 
Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research, Working Paper 091. 
 
Tapsoba, S. J.-A. (2009). Trade Integration and Business Cycle Synchronicity in Africa, 
Journal of African Economies, 18, 287-318. 
 
UNECA – United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2004). Assessing Regional 
Integration in Africa. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
 
UNECA – United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2007). Convergence 
economique en Afrique Centrale. Bureau Sous-regional pour l’Afrique Centrale, 
Yaounde, Cameroon. 
 
Woitek, U. (1998). A Note on the Baxter-King Filter. University of Glasgow, Department 
of Economics Working Paper 9813. 